Why Nakuru activist Laban Omusundi seeks recall powers to rein in Governors, President

A petition seeking the introduction of a citizen-initiated recall mechanism for the President and Governors has been submitted to the Senate, setting the stage for what could become one of the most consequential constitutional debates since the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution.

Laban Omusundi, a public petitioner and a good governance champion argues that Kenya’s accountability framework is incomplete, contending that while citizens are sovereign and possess the power to elect their leaders, they lack an equivalent constitutional tool to directly remove them when representative oversight collapses.

“If citizens can elect, they must equally retain the constitutional mechanism to recall, as a tool of accountability — more so when County Assemblies fail for the Governor and the National Assembly fails for the President,”, states.

Under the current constitutional framework, neither the President nor a County Governor can be removed through direct citizen action. Their removal depends largely on impeachment processes initiated and prosecuted by political institutions.

Article 145 of the Constitution provides for the impeachment of a President on grounds of gross violation of the Constitution or any other law, serious misconduct, or physical or mental incapacity. The process requires a motion supported by at least a third of members of the National Assembly and approval by at least two-thirds of all members before the matter proceeds to the Senate for trial.

For Governors, Article 181 sets out similar grounds for removal, including gross violation of the Constitution, commission of a crime, abuse of office, gross misconduct, or incapacity. The process begins in the County Assembly and, if supported by two-thirds of members, moves to the Senate for determination. A Governor’s office may also fall vacant under Article 182 in cases of death, resignation, loss of eligibility, or conviction for an offence carrying a sentence of at least twelve months.

“Currently, we can recall an elected MCA. The Constitution also contemplates recall of Members of Parliament, but we cannot recall a Governor or the President, yet these are offices we directly elect,” he says, questioning why citizens are entrusted with the power to elect executive leaders but denied a corresponding power to remove them.

Omusundi, however, argues that these mechanisms are structurally dependent on legislators who may be politically aligned with the executive, thereby weakening their willingness to initiate or sustain removal proceedings.

In both national and county governments, impeachment efforts have frequently been characterized by intense political maneuvering, shifting alliances, and protracted court battles that have sometimes overturned Senate decisions on procedural grounds. The high voting thresholds, while designed to prevent frivolous removals, have also made it nearly impossible to remove an executive without significant political realignment.

In such circumstances, the Omusundi argues, citizens are effectively left to wait until the next general election, regardless of the gravity of alleged misconduct. He adds that sovereignty ultimately rests with the people and should not be suspended when representative institutions fail to function properly.

“If we can recall an MCA whom we elect, then under equal treatment of the law, we should also be able to recall the Governor and the President, whom we equally elect,” he notes.

Any introduction of a citizen-initiated recall for Presidents and Governors would require an Act of Parliament, he says, noting that such a mechanism would fundamentally alter the country’s accountability structure by allowing voters, upon meeting a defined threshold, to trigger a recall process independent of Parliament or County Assemblies.

At stake is the redefinition of the relationship between voters and those they elevate to the highest offices. If the power to elect is the cornerstone of democracy, the petition contends, then the power to recall may be its missing safeguard.

Omusundi confirms that he filed the petition in January 2026 and notes that under Senate Standing Orders, the committee is required to deliberate on the matter within 60 calendar days and table its recommendations before the House, although he acknowledges the process could take longer depending on the volume and weight of issues before the committee.