Nakuru's gubernatorial seat, influential constituencies and ethnicity card at play
An aerial view of Nakuru city centre. Photo taken on May 16,2025.
In Nakuru, a county often seen as Kenya’s political barometer, the race for governor has not always been about development, but its influence, control, and survival.
However, winning the seat cannot be assumed to rely solely on popularity. It also demands a strategic game of numbers, networks, and negotiated alliances.
Data from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) shows that Naivasha and the Kuresoi (N&S) sub-counties represent the county’s largest voting blocs, a pattern that could be interpreted as having persisted over the past three gubernatorial elections.
But analysts argue that focusing on constituency-level figures and allegiances with MPs of these voting blocs misses the larger forces at play.
"At the onset of devolution, what mattered most was Nakuru Town East and Nakuru Town West," political analyst Eng. Victor Ngatia explains.
"Because what these two constituencies talked about, basically Nakuru Town, every other sub-county followed suit. They were asking, 'What is the town saying?' So, a lot of people went by how the town would vote."
He says that this was the case in 2017.
However in the 2022 gubernatorial race, which saw the incumbent Lee defeated, negotiated democracy emerged.
First used during the 2017 Senate contest by Susan Kihika, the strategy involved carefully calibrated ethnic coalition-building, a tactic Ngatia refers to as “Kamatusa”.
“It’s not the people voting; it is the politicians planning how the people will vote. And that becomes something that is negotiated,” he explains.
Eng. Ngatia insists that there is no single constituency that directly determines the outcome of Nakuru’s gubernatorial seat.
Instead, influence often comes from communities eager to feel part of the next government, with politicians strategically ensuring representation, for example, positioning a deputy from the Kalenjin community.
This brings us to another common assumption that gubernatorial aspirants must maintain good relationships with constituency MPs to win votes.
According to Ngatia, this is “not necessarily” the case.
“The issue that makes them want to tag along is the finances,” he explains. “It’s not necessarily being on good terms, but the influence and the financial muscle they bring.”
While Nakuru is often described as a cosmopolitan county, analysts note that its politics have historically been shaped by a mix of party dynamics, regional loyalties, and community voting patterns.
On his part, governance expert Laban Omusundi opines that the issue of numbers is a fact and it cannot be belittled or dismissed.”
However, he says that looking at the voting pattern since the onset of devolution, particularly for the gubernatorial seat, the voting factor in Nakuru has been driven by where the ‘mountain’ votes.
He observes that this trend has been consistent since 2013. Even in the last election, he says, “there seemed to be confusion in the mountain and all the people voted where the mountain voted, and that’s how it influenced the votes we had. The people who are associated with the mountain are the ones who managed to get elected.”
“However, the current political climate hints at the mountain being resistant to the UDA wave, and it will be a little bit tricky in terms of even the so-called numbers and other factors,” he notes.
Despite this, he maintains that the pattern of the mountain vote will remain central, “bearing in mind that the majority of the residents in Nakuru are the Kikuyu, and they will automatically vote in the pattern of the mountain.”
Asked how the Kalenjin vote might shape the 2027 race, particularly with the Kuresois forming a major bloc, Omusundi says, “To be a gubernatorial candidate in Nakuru, first and foremost, the aspirant must command the Kikuyus. And when it comes to Kalenjins… there’s a pattern of them getting the office of the deputy governor, which has happened since 2013.”
He explains that this trend has been one way of ensuring inclusion.
But going into 2027, he predicts the two communities may not vote in the same basket, and sees aspirants requesting the Kalenjin vote by having to associate with the president.
If that does not happen, he notes that with the simple majority of the Kikuyu vote, an aspirant may still get the seat without the Kalenjin vote, especially if they can command other areas too.
He acknowledges that while those other regions matter, they may not be a factor when you have command from the main community.